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978-0-5218-5890-8, $24.99 (pbk.) 
In a world that had largely adopted a Deweyan sense of itself, Body Consciousness 
would not have to be written.  In such a world, it would be taken for granted that 
philosophy should account for sensory experience as much as for cognitive expe-
rience, that there are no minds apart from the bodies that support them, and that 
conscious reflection on the health and well-being of those bodies is a necessary el-
ement of any journey to enlightenment or happiness. However, we do not yet live 
in such a world, at least not we philosophers, who continue to write as if thinking 
can be thought about in isolation from the physical environment, that intelligence 
is a purely mental quality, and that focusing on the body is both narcissistic and 
unrelated to moral growth. Contemporary culture reflects this lack of understand-
ing in its fixation on idealized images of the external body, its increasing reliance 
on pain-killers and other symptom-alleviating drugs (both legal and illegal), and 
its failure to adequately overcome social and racial inequalities and stereotypes 
often associated with bodies that are different from a norm. For a Deweyan phi-
losopher, the underlying presumptions of these cultural failings are preposterous, 
given Dewey’s lifelong attempt to describe experience as situated and transactional, 
body-mind as a continuous whole, and freedom as the result of a willingness to 
incorporate the physical environment into intelligent action. 
Richard Shusterman is most definitely a Deweyan, having developed his 
own flavor of Deweyan pragmatism in previous essays and books—most clearly 
in his 1997 Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life—and this 
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book reflects that orientation throughout, leading to a wholeheartedly Deweyan 
consummation in a chapter entitled “Redeeming Somatic Reflection: John Dew-
ey’s Philosophy of Body-Mind.”  This consummation comes, however, only after 
a thorough examination of ideas about the role of the body in the works of Fou-
cault, Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir, Wittgenstein, and William James, in 
each case showing how those ideas—while an improvement on the classical mind-
body dualisms of Plato, Descartes, and Kant—are still limited in terms of either 
philosophical theory, ideas about everyday living, or the practical means of incor-
porating “body consciousness” into healthy living. For this book seeks not only 
to overcome traditional dualisms about mind and body, questioning philosophy’s 
longstanding reluctance to take full account of the role of the body in lived experi-
ence, but also to overcome the tendency of philosophy to distance itself from em-
bodied practices, such as meditation, yoga, and the Alexander/Feldenkrais meth-
ods of somatic education, as well as from the “merely” empirical sciences and such 
seemingly nonphilosophical everyday activities as sex, eating, and exercise. What 
Shusterman seeks, and what he eventually suggests that Dewey has come closest to 
providing, is a comprehensive understanding of experience, incorporating thought, 
word, deed, and even spirit.  
I found myself both engrossed with and intrigued by this book through-
out. It is lucidly written for a general educated audience, assuming little specific 
knowledge of the philosophers it treats, but moves quickly beyond reiteration, 
not distracted by irrelevant details, as it continually builds toward its Deweyan 
conclusions. It includes numerous helpful footnotes that provide guidance to 
those who wish to explore Shusterman’s more controversial claims in further 
detail. I especially liked the way that Shusterman weaves contemporary issues 
such as commercialism, the proper role of technology, policies towards people 
with disabilities, and attitudes towards difference into his narrative.  Perhaps the 
only meaningful criticism I can make of the book is that, for a reader with a solid 
understanding of Dewey’s work (that is, well beyond his explicitly educational 
writings), the book sometimes tantalizingly withholds the obvious Deweyan im-
plications of a particular dialectical line of thinking until the last chapter or hints 
at them in a footnote referencing Dewey. Such readers will see through some of 
Shusterman’s more obvious rhetorical ploys—not so often as to frustrate, but cer-
tainly enough to leave a knowing smile of anticipation.  I think this demonstrates 
that Shusterman is not just preaching to the choir here: he wants to effect some 
conversions as well. Convicted Deweyans will have to tolerate these moments 
for the sake of Shusterman’s greater ambitions. 
Somaesthetics, which Shusterman first introduced in Practicing Philosophy, is 
a disciplinary framework that critically examines the relationship between the soma, 
or “living, feeling, sentient body” (p. 1), and philosophical thought, while seeking 
to change the ways that we think about ourselves and live our lives. Somaesthetics 
includes three branches: “The analytic study of the body’s role in perception, ex-
perience, and action and thus in our mental, moral, and social life; the pragmatic 
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study of methodologies to improve our body-mind functioning and thus expand 
our capacities of self-fashioning; and the practical branch that investigates such 
pragmatic methods by testing them on our own flesh in concrete experience and 
practice” (p. 139). Essential to the successful pursuit of the discipline, then, is not 
only a willingness to acknowledge the role of the body in our entire lives, but also 
a willingness to use our own bodies to explore and understand that role and how 
certain experiences can shape ourselves and our culture. 
Somaesthetics unconditionally accepts that our bodies represent the core 
of our being and identity, forming “our primary perspective or mode of engage-
ment with the world, determining (often unconsciously) our choice of ends and 
means by structuring the very needs, habits, interests, pleasures, and capacities 
on which those ends and means rely for their significance” (pp. 2-3), thus inexo-
rably affecting our thinking and our culture. Thus, we both have bodies and are 
bodies; everything we feel and do is mediated by and through our bodies. If, 
Shusterman argues, we fail to adequately understand the sheer physicality of 
ourselves and others—if we think about thinking without acknowledging that 
all thinking takes place within organic living brains that cannot in any sense be 
separated from our bodies or from the physical environment in which we live, 
breathe, and experience—then we will establish both moral ideals and cultural 
practices that lead inevitably to moral and physical disease and social discord. 
Avoiding such consequences requires “body consciousness.”
One interesting aspect of the book is that it doesn’t follow a chronological 
path. Rather than showing how Dewey represents the culmination of a steady im-
provement of thought through the generations, with each philosopher incorporating 
the insights of his or her forebears, Shusterman starts in the recent past with Fou-
cault, and proceeds from there backwards in time to Merleau-Ponty, then Simone 
de Beauvoir, then Wittgenstein, and then William James.  It’s as if he is trying to 
show where contemporary philosophy went awry in its trajectory, locating signifi-
cant errors in recent thinking, and then digging further back to find the source 
of those errors, looking for something less off the track. Thus, Foucault, writes 
Shusterman, shows a far greater willingness than many of his peers to explore the 
relationship between thought and body—especially the body’s physical pleasure 
or pain—and to see the body as “an especially vital site for self-knowledge and 
self-transformation” (p. 9), but gets trapped in a crippling obsession with deviant 
practices such as sadomasochistic sex and the use of drugs.  Seeking the origins 
of this distraction, Shusterman traces the roots of Foucault’s thought in the ideas 
of Merleau-Ponty, who, while seeing the physical body as the source of all sponta-
neity and truth, places conscious reflection about the body into a forbidden zone, 
lest such consciousness allow small-minded logic to smother the body’s truth. 
Even Simon de Beauvoir, who worked to bring the experience of philosophically 
neglected women and elderly people into philosophy’s purview and wrote exten-
sively about the objectification of the body in Western culture, was trapped in the 
view that working directly on one’s own body was inevitably to feed forms of social 
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oppression. Merleau-Ponty’s and Beauvoir’s errors, says Shusterman, can be traced 
in part to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein did more than any other twentieth-century 
philosopher to dispel certain unconscious assumptions about the relationship be-
tween mind and body, many contained in our linguistic inheritances. Wittgenstein 
offers a key insight in showing that human thought and action—rather than origi-
nating solely in the mind or completely in the organic systems of the body—reflect 
the entire context in which they take place, including the physical environment as 
well as social norms, ideals, and common practices. While he briefly touches on 
the ways that better consciousness of emotions and feelings in relation to that ex-
tended context can be utilized for both moral and aesthetic self-improvement and 
for political progress, Wittgenstein fails to adequately develop the implications 
of his insights, especially the possibility of adjusting people’s visceral reactions to 
others of different ethnic backgrounds through a form of mindfulness training. In 
short, while Wittgenstein comes very close to an understanding of the role of the 
body in thought and culture, his work stops short of the pragmatic implications of 
such theory that Shusterman wants to include in his somaesthetics. In pursuit of 
such implications, Shusterman goes back further to a thinker who catalyzed many 
of Wittgenstein’s ideas: William James.  
In James, Shusterman finds some of the original conceptions that he seeks. 
James, more than anyone who came before and many of those who came after, de-
veloped a comprehensive understanding of the continuity of mental and physical 
experience, failing only in the specific recommendations he made for cultivating 
the body—an error Shusterman attributes to James’s own physical ailments and the 
New England culture in which he lived—and in an inadequate conception of the 
relation of body and mind to the will. James understood the essentially continuous 
organic nature of mind and body to a degree that many of his twentieth-century 
followers did not. Quoting James’s “The Experience of Activity,” Shusterman writes, 
“The body . . . is the storm centre, the origin of coordinates, the constant place of 
stress in [our] experience-train. Everything circles round it, and is felt from its point 
of view” (p. 135). James’s clarity on the body is due in part to his early training in 
anatomy and physiology and his knowledge of the emergent field of experimental 
psychology. This foundation gave James a unique perspective that allowed him to 
bridge disciplinary boundaries (boundaries which, by the way, have gotten deeper 
and wider in the intervening years; this perhaps accounting for why contemporary 
philosophers have proven unable to build successfully on James’s comprehensive 
understanding). Shusterman spends a good deal of effort discussing both the 
strengths and limitations of James’s account of the body, with special attention to 
the ways that James’s life experiences relate to the ways that he developed his ideas. 
The details of James’s biographical and autobiographical stories give Shusterman an 
opportunity to discuss more fully the pragmatic and practical sides of somaesthet-
ics in a way that will likely resonate with his scholarly readers, many of whom, like 
James, may be afflicted with imperfect “uses” of their bodies, perhaps exacerbated 
by too much attention given to the life of the mind (or to their computers).
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Shusterman devotes considerable attention to James’s systematic treatment 
of the role of habit in human experience. Habits, for James, are the building blocks 
of both individuality and of culture, representing the organic embodiment of at-
titudes, values, knowledge, skills, and ideals, and blessing humanity with both the 
transformative possibilities of successful education and the frustratingly difficult 
task of social improvement. Shusterman doesn’t simply reiterate James’s insights 
on habit, but shows how they are reaffirmed to a large extent by the findings of 
contemporary neurology, most explicitly in the work of Antonio Damasio. Hab-
its operate continuously, usually unconsciously, providing a background of self-
identity and performative automaticity that makes human consciousness, willful 
attention, and sustained reasoning possible. 
The final chapter of Body Consciousness further explores the importance of 
habit through examination of the work of Dewey, who found his entire concep-
tion of the human self fundamentally transformed by reading James’s Principles of 
Psychology, and who, more than James, completely accepted nondualistic natural-
ism, not only in biology, but in psychology, aesthetics, and even religion. Indeed, 
Dewey invented the term “body-mind” (or “mind-body”) to express the oneness 
of the self and to avoid falling into old habits when discussing their relationships. 
This naturalist conception infuses Dewey’s middle and later works, most explic-
itly in Human Nature and Conduct (1922), which explores in detail the ways that 
habit interacts with native impulses and intelligence, and the important implica-
tions of these interactions for human and social development. Dewey also incor-
porates insights he gained from his personal experience of relearning how to use 
his own body from F. M. Alexander and his brother, A. R. The Alexander method 
was essential in cementing Dewey’s theoretical views into a coherent world view. 
Most importantly, Alexander helped Dewey to see that the refusal to allow a habit 
to kick in—what Alexander referred to as “inhibition”—is a key to understanding 
the mechanisms of free will without falling into dualistic thinking, as James had. 
For Dewey, there is no opposition between habit and thought or will; rather, the 
important distinction is between unintelligent or routine habit, and intelligent or 
reflective habit.  Self-fulfillment for Dewey is a matter of employing intelligent, or 
artistic, habits to gradually modify the “bundle of ‘complex, unstable, opposing 
attitudes, habits, impulses’ we call the self” (p. 205; quoting Dewey, MW 14:96), in 
a direction that is compatible with desired ends-in-view. The self constitutes what 
Shusterman says is a “multifaceted, complexly integrated, dynamic field rather than 
a simple, static, linear system” (p. 208), and successful living requires conscious 
appreciation for, selective attention to, and painstaking amelioration of the self ’s 
pluralistic elements in all their dimensions. 
Recall that somaesthetics involves both pragmatic and practical aspects as 
well as analytical ones. It therefore cannot be confined, as much of philosophy has 
been, to mere theory. Nor can it be constrained to widely accepted social practices. 
Thus, Shusterman applauds Foucault for his transgressive assault on contemporary 
sexual practices as well as James for his experiments in various methods of personal 
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improvement, including “moral holidays,” wearing corsets, electric shocks, spinal 
vibration, marijuana, and mescaline. While Shusterman himself doesn’t claim to 
participate in these forms of investigation (although he explicitly refers through-
out the book to his own training in Zen Buddhism and the Feldenkrais method, 
and often uses examples that implicitly reveal some of his own experiences of 
sex), he does suggest that the successful somaesthetician—indeed, the successful 
human—will examine both personal habits and social norms, regarding them as 
fundamentally tentative. 
Dewey’s experiences with the Alexander method as well as Shusterman’s 
own experiences suggest that efforts at self-improvement often require the guid-
ance of trained teachers and wise others, who can help us to see ourselves in new 
and more comprehensive ways. For we must understand our bodies not only from 
the inside, but must gain appreciation for how they look from the outside and for 
how their actions and inactions affect and are affected by the environment. An 
expanded notion of self that includes not only the mind and body, but the entire 
social and physical context in which they exist, leads Shusterman to an essentially 
spiritual conclusion: “This relational symbiotic notion of the self inspires a more 
extensive notion of somatic meliorism in which we are also charged with caring 
for and harmonizing the environmental affordances of our embodied selves, not 
just our own body parts” (p. 215). He continues, “By enabling us to feel more of 
our universe with greater acuity, awareness, and appreciation, such a vision of 
somaesthetic cultivation promises the richest and deepest palate of experiential 
fulfillments because it can draw on the profusion of cosmic resources, including 
an uplifting sense of cosmic unity” (p. 216). That sense of unity, which motivated 
Dewey and motivates many of us, can provide us and our communities with en-
hanced meaning, direction, and purpose. This, Shusterman claims, is ultimately 
why we should pay attention to the life of our bodies as well as our minds.
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